Skopje Dnevnik 24 Sep 09 p 2 Report by Zana P. Bozinovska: "Ivanov With His Own Dual Formula" Macedonian government representatives generally refuse to comment on Greece's statements, because they believe that it is improper to comment during an election campaign. Still, Macedonia's politicians are unanimous that they expected the name issue to be used in the campaign and that an even harsher rhetoric is expected on this matter. "We are under the impression that PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] is more moderate, but I would not be surprised if its rhetoric gets more aggressive as the campaign progresses. There, too, the name has proved to be a strong argument to win or lose elections," DUI official Ermira Mehmeti says. In her view, the use of the name issue in the campaign is not an extenuating circumstance for Macedonia and requires the active involvement of a third party, such as name mediator Matthew Nimetz. Vlado Buckovski, former prime minister and SDSM Assembly deputy, does not expect a shift in the Greek name position even if the Greek Government does change. He believes that, if Papandreou wins, he will try to send out a signal in the form of a procedure, as was the case with PASOK's announcement for the political refugees' return. "We wrongly believe that, if Papandreou wins, they will change their position. It is also clear that Greece will not put itself in a position of vetoing our state's EU integration, but that the potential beginning of the EU membership talks will be conditioned with good neighborly relations," Buckovski explains. LDP official Andrej Zernovski says that Papandreou's real agenda cannot be revealed during the election campaign, but it is clear that he uses the same tones as Karamanlis"I expect Papandreou to be more constructive and show an honest intention to negotiate and a sincere wish to find a solution, because negotiations are merely shammed," Zernovski says. He believes that Brussels, too, mostly believes that the PASOK leader is more prepared for a solution, but we must not neglect the fact that this issue is part of the election strategy related to the voters, especially those in Greece's northern part. -============================= Skopje MIA 24 Sep 09 "Steinberg: Macedonia Creates Positive Climate in Name Talks" New York, September 24 (MIA) -- The US goal is to see Macedonia swiftly integrated into the NATO and the EU. Washington wants a solution to be found for name dispute and encourages Skopje and Athens, after elections in Greece, to continue the talks under the mediation of Matthew Nimetz, US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said after late Wednesday's [ 23 September] meeting in New York with Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov, MIA reports. US Ambassador to Skopje Philip Reeker, who attended the meeting, said that Steinberg hopes that two parties after the elections in Greece on Oct. 4 will keep the focus on negotiation process. - We hope that the process will continue once new Greek Government will be formed and that the two countries will use the chance and with assistance of UN mediator Nimetz will achieve progress and will find a solution as soon as possible, Reeker said. The US remains prepared to help and to support the process. Steinberg congratulated Ivanov on positive climate achieved in the name talks with Greece in the past four months since his presidential mandate. He emphasized that Macedonia worked hard and made large progress in fulfilling the reforms needed for membership in the Euro-Atlantic organized, for which it has strong support from Washington. President Ivanov said that Macedonia sincerely wants solution to be found and is always prepared to hold talks for surpassing the sole obstacle for its integration into the NATO and the EU. He hopes that after the elections in Greece, the previous dynamics of the negotiation process will be kept. He presented Macedonian expectations for positive report from the European Commission but also for the political decision to start EU talks. Ivanov and Steinberg discussed about the declaration for strategic partnership and cooperation between the US and Macedonia which was assessed as very important for the bilateral relations. Macedonian troops in Afghanistan and new joint mission with the Vermont National Guard are seen as important steps in building strategic partnership. Ivanov is to meet with Tony Blinken, national security advisor to US Vice-President Joseph Biden, and will hold talks with UN mediator Matthew Nimetz. -============================= Athens Elevtherotipia 12 Sep 09 pp 17, 18, 31, 32 Report by Yeoryios Tsakiris: "A Billion-Dollar Waterloo" According to military analysts, three elements differentiate a country at peace from one in a state of war. These are: the operational expenses of the armed forces, the structure of their forces, and armaments expenditure. Furthermore, the same analysts believe that what is more important is not so much the height of armaments expenditure but the size of the armed forces, the number of their units, and their structure. All countries have armaments expenditure, and they will continue to have them, considering the fact that most of them participate in peace-keeping operations either under UN or NATO auspices. Furthermore, many countries are forced to spend money on arms procurement because of pressure from their countries' manufacturing companies in order that the latter will not be forced to close or to lay off some of their staff. Considering the size, expenditure, operating methods, and structure of the Greek armed forces, our country is in a state of war, irrespective of whether this is being waged through bloody battles or its nature resembles that of the cold war era. In either case it amounts to a balance of terror. Greece is the sole country whose operational expenses for its armed forces exceed the budget approved for the ministry of health by 810 million euros. They are also equivalent to the interior ministry's budget and just 574 million euros less that the amount spent on education. The Greek national defense ministry's total expenditure is bigger than the total amount spent by 19 other ministries. We are the only NATO country with the biggest defense expenditure as a proportion of our GDP [Gross Domestic Product]. According to NATO statistics, in 2008 Greece spent 2.8% of its GDP for defense purposes with only the United States having a bigger percentage. Staff officers, both officially and unofficially, claim that if there was no crisis defense expenditure would have been only 30% of what it is today. According to them, in addition to the expenses incurred in confronting the Aegean crisis, there would have been changes in the structure, size, and expenses of the armed forces. The economic data, combined with the structure of the armed forces, are unique for European standards. They have similarities only with countries in a state of war, or passing through a post-war period, or governed by a military junta. One typical example is the fact that the national defense ministry's expenditure for 2009 mounted to 6.9 billion euros. At today's prices the war in Kosovo cost 2.1 billion euros, the Gulf War 50 billion euros, and the war in Vietnam 357 billion euros. Also estimated at today's prices, the average cost of the "war" in the Aegean since 1974 has cost us the following: In fuel, maintenance, and personnel used for interceptions 1.8 billion euros; in fuel, maintenance, and the cost of crews serving on vessels either on patrol or on standby 1.4 billion euros; and more than 120 billion euros were also spent on operational expenses according to the war structure existing in all army, air force, and navy units. The existing tension has cost us a total of 123.2 billion euros, which is equivalent to 61 Kosovo wars and is also higher than two Gulf Wars. For 35 Years Victims of a Cold War Two days ago we lost yet another young man; one of our own children who played war games in order to make a living. He used to drive his battle tank up to the Evros River in order to display, as the generals were telling him, the materiel in our possession. A few days ago, in another type of war, we lost the Attiki. Thousands of our trees were burned, most of whom we planted and took care of ourselves in order, as we were claiming at the time, to bequeath some clean air to our children. We have lost yet more of our young men. These were asked to play war but were killed in peacetime. With them we have "lost" dozens of hospitals, hundreds of schools, a free system of education with well-paid teachers, free health care with well-paid doctors, hundreds of kilometers of new roads, even respectable unemployment, social assistance, and heating benefits, and God knows what else has already been lost or will be lost in the future. Everything and all of us have been victims of a cold war that for 35 years has been economically eroding Greece and denying us of many things that civilized countries consider natural for the welfare of their citizens and the future of their children. Numbers do not suffice to reflect the cost incurred by Greece since 1974. You cannot put a figure on the value of human life. The state has proved incapable of protecting the environment because of its shortage of funds. You cannot put on a value on the burned areas of Attiki, or on the areas of Ileia, Zakinthos, and Rhodes, as well as all the other areas that during the past years have been turned into ashes. The shortages in schools, rural hospitals, health centers, and hospitals cannot be assessed in financial terms. Badly-paid teachers cannot be valued as it is impossible to put a value on the 3.000 empty positions in the Fire Brigade, positions that a few days ago could have made all the difference in putting out the forest fires. According to Georges Clemenceau, "War is too grave a matter to entrust to military men." The unfortunate fact is that in Greece you cannot leave it even in the hands of politicians. Since 1974 both the politicians and the military have introduced a defense doctrine that has led us to nowhere. The view that "if we did not prepare for war most probably there would be no peace today" has been proved wrong, because a state of war is not merely the firing of bullets. The so-called Cold War between the US and the USSR was also a kind of warfare since, according to some financial analysts, the rampant armaments race was responsible for administering the coup de grace to the economies of the Warsaw Pact countries. We are also in a state of war having spent, since the fall of the dictatorship, nearly 11% of our GDP on weapons procurement and leaving in the process debts that our children will have to pay. A kind of state of war exists when all countries forge ahead by reaching a modus vivendi with their neighbors, even if they had been responsible for flattening them in both World War 1 and World War 2 but today, instead of battle tanks and warplanes they are buying health, education, and security. An image of war can be seen in our hospitals, overflowing with rudimentary beds and lacking both doctors and operating instruments. One can see an image of war if he visits the Pentagon [Greek national defense ministry] and meets military officers who are not afraid of saying that we should not be using helicopters for fighting forest fires because while these are busy dousing the fires with water the country's enemies would invade us. An image of war is when a country of 11 million souls maintains the biggest army in Europe, employs nearly as many generals as the United States, has many more battle tanks that the whole of Europe, and many other such examples. An 80% Reduction If We Did Not Have a Crisis The Greek Army is in a state of absolute chaos. Nobody knows anything, nobody knows how much something costs, and nobody reveals any evidence. Everything is classified. Consequently, what we are publishing today is based on the personal assessments of military officers since they are in a position to know the current deployment of the various military units as well as the costs involved according to the official statistics of the national economy and finance ministry. According to available data, 2.1 billion euros have been approved for the Greek Army's operational expenses during 2009. This amount includes nearly all expenses but they does not include the procurement of weapons systems, ammunition, weapons, motor vehicles, and other materiel. Despite the fact that the Army General Staff is treating all information pertaining to the number of active units as classified, national defense ministry sources have quoted an outrageous figure that is nearly, and in fact could exceed, the 2.000 figure, including small and large units. The same applies to the case of Greek Army personnel, both reservists and active. Official figures state that the Greek Army consists of 102.000 men and women. The reality, however, is that after the reduction in the length of compulsory military service this figure does not exceed 80.000. According to a number of officers who were asked whether if there was no threat and tension with Turkey the size of the Greek Army should have been on the same level as that of Denmark's, a country that not only maintains its own armed forces but also actively participates in various NATO and UN international missions. Military officers prefer to make the comparison with Denmark because from the geopolitical point of view this is the European country closest to us. Another argument also used by the same officers is that the units required are currently stationed on our western borders, a region facing practically no threat barring the problem of illegal immigration. Therefore, and considering the above, the officers believe that if there had been no threat this would have meant a reduction of 80% in the number of units, operational expenses, and armaments needs for the Greek Army. As has been the case with other European countries, the Greek Army could be stripped of its own air branch, in other words to operate without helicopters and other systems. An army of between 15.000 and 20.000 men and women would be in a position to meet all our international obligations -- in a more effective manner than it is doing today -- and to offer relief in the case of natural disasters or, even, to protect against asymmetric threats. If no threat had existed there would have been no need to station military units across the various islands, something that involves substantial cost, not forgetting the many units serving on the Evros River front. Operational expenses would not have exceeded 500 million euros per annum, including the cost of international missions, and between 1.8 and 2.2 billion euros would have been saved annually. Greek Navy: 55.000 Euros per Day Is the Cost of Each Frigate It is not an easy task to calculate the cost of the tension in the Aegean. A maritime nation such as Greece, with so many islands, is obliged to deploy naval units in its seas even if it is not facing any threat. After all this is the reason why Greek warships are patrolling in the Ionian Sea where, as known, there are no claims against it by third countries. Despite this, Greek Navy officers are of the opinion that Turkish policies have forced us to have an armed forces's structure, as well as such a presence in the Aegean, that can never be considered as being compatible with the word "peace." As an example, officers cite the case of Denmark a country that for the past three years, following its decision to follow what all other countries are doing and reduce defense expenditure, has scrapped its submarine fleet despite having being the pride of its navy for some 95 years. According to statements made by Danish officials it was decided to completely scrap, rather than reduce, the submarine fleet because a mere reduction would not have resulted in any lowering of operational costs. The reason for this was that if the decision as to reduce the submarine fleet it would mean the continuation of a technical and spare parts department as well as the continuation of the necessary administrative services. In the case of the Greek Navy, and based on published evidence, the existence of tension in the Aegean has forced us to maintain round-the-clock patrols in three sectors: the Northern Aegean, the Southern Aegean, and the area around the islands of Imia and Farmakonisi. This has led to the deployment of three gunboats in the region, assisted by four more vessels, two patrol boats and two high-speed missile-carrying craft. Furthermore, one frigate is permanently stationed nearby. It has been calculated that according to 2008 prices the daily cost of one frigate is 35.000 euros if 70% of her time is spent sailing and the remaining 30% at anchor. This figure includes all expenses such as maintenance, fuel, and the cost of feeding her crew. The corresponding cost for a gunboat is estimated to be 25.000 euros per day, if she spends 50% of her time at sea and 50% at anchor. One direct consequence of the need to maintain a naval presence in the Aegean is the operation of battle-ready bases, the maintenance of several crews and spare parts depots, the full manning of all naval bases, and the availability of support and other vessels. According to a Greek Navy officer, had there been no threat the navy's presence in the Aegean would have been at the same level as the one in the Ionian Sea. This means either one or two vessels and, naturally, no frigates or gunboats but small patrol craft that would have put to sea only when needed. Under such circumstances the vessels would have been sailing for no more than two months per year. This would have meant saving the costs of ten months of sailing time in each year for at least five large navy ships, leading to an average saving of 27.000 euros per day. Multiplying this figure by 300 sailing days, the total amount saved in each year would be in the region of 40.5 million euros and this is just in operational expenses alone. Greek Air Force: 416.3 Million Euros for Interceptions Within a Eight-Year Period Pilots believe that the cost incurred by the Greek Air Force for intercepting Turkish infringements and violations of national airspace can de deduced by counting the number of aircraft that have taken off to identify and intercept Turkish fighters and multiplying this number by the hourly cost of each fighter. Based on data by aircraft manufacturers, the aircraft flown by the Greek Air Force have an hourly cost ranging from 10.000 to 20.000 euros per hour, according to the type of aircraft flown. Thus the average rate is 15.000 euros per hour. This figure represents one hour's flying fuel costs, the cost of maintaining the aircraft's radar systems and support crews, including the cost of ground schools and training flights required before a pilot can be rated to fly the particular aircraft type. Although there is no official model for calculating hourly flight costs, the above is the normal method used by air forces to arrive at a figure for the average hourly cost of each flight. Based on reports prepared by the YEA [Air Force General Staff] from 2000 to 2008 the Turkish Air Force carried out 46.150 flights over the Aegean and inside Greece's area of responsibility. In many cases the flights took place inside Greek national airspace. In order to intercept them, Greece fighters flew 18.505 missions. With the average flight time being one-and-a-half hours, the figures show that Greek fighters have flown a total of 27.757,5 hours on interception missions. By multiplying the average hourly cost of each flight -- this is 15.000 euros -- the total cost of the flights is 416.3 million euros. It should be pointed out that the above amount is additional to the cost of normal flights flown by the Greek Air Force that would have taken place even if there were no Turkish infringements or violations. This cost does not include the cost of aircraft that have been lost during the course of an interception. According to official statistics, four fighter aircraft have been lost and four Greek pilots lost their lives while engaged in the process of interception. Two of the fighters were F-4 Phantoms, with the two-man crew of one being killed, one was a Mirage F-1 (whose pilot was killed), and one was an F-16 (whose pilot was also killed).. However, there has been no official announcement regarding the cost of the lost aircraft, nor is it possible to calculate it, because we have no knowledge of the type of weapons system carried by the aircraft in question when it was lost. Naturally, it is impossible to calculate the cost of a human life, particularly when this is lost in peacetime. Most of the violations for which Turkish aircraft were responsible were carried out between six and 10 nautical miles away from the Greek islands, in areas that Turkey is disputing whether they belong to Greece. During the past years, at least in the case of the Greek Air Force but also on the political level, the need to define the extent of Greek national airspace is becoming more evident. We are currently the only country in the world whose territorial waters do not have the same extent as its national airspace, something that runs contrary to the provisions of international treaties. Typical of the situation is the fact that more and more officers are now openly expressing the view that an arrangement should be reached over the issue of the Aegean. These officers are saying that it is no longer acceptable that we should be mourning the loss of lives in peacetime or to be spending vast sums of money in fuel and armaments if a political arrangement can resolve the issue. According to these officers: "On many occasions the continuing interceptions in the Aegean have forced pilots and aircraft to their limits. Errors have been committed and both sides have lost men in peacetime. On some occasions a casus belli existed but, fortunately, we never went that far.. On these occasions use was made of the Athens to Ankara hotline and an order was given to both sides to scale down the tension. This proves that if both sides want solutions can be found. This is what we should be doing now." |
Πέμπτη 24 Σεπτεμβρίου 2009
Turkey Purchase of Patriots
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