http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dfvhbtgv_23427gptppjcs&invite=
Just FYI,
The Google Docs Team
Athens O Kosmos tou Ependhiti 20 Feb 10 p 33
Report and commentary by Manos Iliadhis: A Ground to . . . Space Flaws
Approximately four months ago (in the 31 October 2009 edition of O Kosmos Tou Ependhiti) this columnist has pointed out our country's shortcomings in space. Two months ago (on 17 December 2009), a date that saw the launch of the Helios-2B [military spy satellite], in which Greece is a partner, the situation is still continuing with the same characteristic slackness, fraught with many examples of mistakes and timidity that were the trade mark of the previous YPEEThA [National Defense Ministry]
leaders. Consequently, in view of the fact that the problems over policy decisions are still continuing, the O Kosmos Tou Ependhiti has decided to revert, yet again, to the same issue.
As we had reported in last October's edition, the problems concerning our country's participation in this program began with the erroneous decision taken by the previous YPEEThA leaders in August 2009. The decision was that the body responsible for the advanced technology "Helios" program should be the YEEThA [National Defense General Staff] rather than the YEA [Air Force General Staff] that had been so far responsible. It should be remembered that until then the YEEThA wanted to have nothing to do with this program, arguing that it preferred to obtain images from commercial satellites. Although this preference was approved by the SAYE [General Staff Officers' Council] in January 2005, the YEEThA still failed to implement the decision since it lacked at the time the necessary infrastructure and the skilled personnel required. This was due to the fact that all issues relating to satellite-generated intelligence gathering had been traditionally the domain of the YEA, something consistent with international practices, which treats space as an extension of airspace.
The developments that followed as a result of this flawed decision led to repeated delays and problems, costing both time and money. More specifically, although the relevant negotiations concerning the program were successfully completed in December 2005, and the original table also wanted the agreement to be signed during the same month -- thus enabling the land-based station at Tanagra to be operational within 24 months, in other words by December 2007 -- in the end the agreement was signed in August 2006. This meant that, instead of December 2007, the land-based station would have been operational by September 2008. However, even this deadline was not met and, as far as we are in a position to know, the Tanagra station is still not operational.
A Tug-of-War
When the YEEThA realized, after the decision to change the body responsible for the program, that it was not a project within its capabilities, it decided to assign responsibility for its management to the Greek Air Force's EKDE [National Space Research Center]. Even then, it took almost a whole year before this decision was put into effect in August 2007. The Greek Air Force's leadership did not agree with the decision, arguing that since it was the branch responsible for attacking 95% of the other side's [enemy's] targets there was an imperative need for it to have instant access to intelligence gathered by the Helios-2. Moreover, it foresaw the problems and the malfunctions to be caused by changing the EKDE's line of command and thus creating problems in a procedure was well-tested by the Greek Air Force during the past 15 years and had proved that it was capable of providing all branches of the armed forces with an uninterrupted flow of satellite-generated intelligence.
What made the situation even worse was the fact the that the YEEThA, in what must certainly a world first, assigned responsibility for the implementation of the program to . . . Greek Army officers who, since they were coming for the first time face-to-face with issues relating to space technology, was only natural that they would need a long time before they were in a position to understand the subject. As if this was not enough, the YEEThA pushed for another SAYE decision (this was taken on 29 November 2006) according to which it was given responsibility for "deciding on earth-surveillance policies." This decision overlooked an earlier one giving the same responsibility to the General Directorate for National Defense and International Relations Policy, which was implemented through a specially set-up Space Office! Although the General Directorate protested against the decision and managed to have it annulled, what remained unchanged was the definition that the "satellite-based earth surveillance system is limited to image gathering from the 'Helios' military satellite and any further developments of this system." This last sentence was obviously a reference to the MUSIS [Multinational Space-based Imaging] system in which our country has taken a decision in principle to join.
What does this suggest? It is certain that the SAYE was not even aware that its decision was contrary to older, and still valid, decision taken by a more senior body, this time it was the December 1999 decision of the Defense Council, which stressed the need to obtain radar images from a satellite. Moreover, the same SAYE decision violated one of its own decisions, taken in August 2005, which again wanted radar images to be captured by satellites.
The result of all the above, conflicting, decisions is that the need to secure radar images has not only never been met but all indications suggest that this will not be achieved for a long time yet. It appears that what has now been decided is that this need should be met through our country's participation in the MUSIS program, which is planned to succeed the Helios-2. The estimated cost for the MUSIS is believed to be between three and four billion euro and it is expected that this system will be able to combine optical with radar images. Its cameras will be able to identify objects up to 15 centimeters long and it should be operational by 2015, which coincides with the end of the expected life of the Helios-2.
However, some information suggests that two of the countries planning to contribute radar-image systems now appear to be having second thoughts. They are Germany, with its SAR Lupe and Italy with its Cosmo-SkyMed systems. Although each for different reasons, they are reported as preferring to exchange radar images from French satellites in exchange for more optical images from the Helios-2.
This means that for as long as the objections raised by Germany and Italy remain to be overcome, the Greek armed forces will be unable to meet their needs for radar images or, in the best of circumstances, nobody will be in a position to say when these needs will be met.
Αναρτήσεις
Δεν υπάρχουν σχόλια:
Δημοσίευση σχολίου